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Abstract
European party systems have experienced crucial changes 
over the last few decades. Key among these changes have 
been the electoral punishment of incumbent parties, the po-
litical activation of populist attitudes, and the emergence of 
new parties. These phenomena have been strongly condi-
tioned by the intensity of the economic crisis experienced by 
European countries. The analyses we present here constitute 
a first attempt to comparatively examine the main character-
istics of spatial and ideological party competition in Spain, 
France, and Italy after the Great Recession. Our analysis 
compares actual ideological positions (as perceived by all 
voters) to the ideal or optimal ideological party positions pre-
dicted by spatial competition models based on proximity and 
directional voting, always on the assumption that parties will 
choose those positions that allow them to maximize their vote 
shares. Our analysis aims at assessing the degree to which 
public attitudes connected to the Great Recession, in par-
ticular, government evaluations and populist attitudes, have 
affected ideological locations. Our results show that there are 
appreciable differences between the estimates inferred from 
models using crisis-related variables and those derived from 
models that did not include such variables. The analysis also 
shows that the estimates based on models using govern-
mental performance evaluations and populist attitudes are 
slightly closer to the real positions of political parties. Finally, 
we also observe that differences in ideal estimates are larger 
in Spain and Italy, that is, in the two countries that suffered 
the most during the Great Recession.
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Resumen
Los sistemas de partidos europeos han experimentado grandes 
cambios en las últimas décadas. Especialmente importantes en 
este sentido han sido el castigo electoral de los partidos gobernan-
tes, la activación política de las actitudes populistas y la emergen-
cia de nuevos partidos. Estos fenómenos han estado fuertemente 
condicionados por la intensidad de la crisis económica experi-
mentada por los países europeos. Los análisis que se presentan 
aquí examinan las principales características de la competición 
ideológica y espacial después de la Gran Recesión en España, 
Francia e Italia. Nuestro análisis compara las posiciones ideológi-
cas reales (percibidas por todos los votantes) con las posiciones 
ideales y óptimas predichas por modelos de competición espacial 
basados en voto de proximidad y direccional, siempre bajo la pre-
misa de que los partidos elegirán aquellas posiciones que les per-
mitan maximizar su porcentaje de votos. Nuestro análisis intenta 
estimar el grado en el que las actitudes públicas conectadas a la 
Gran Recesión, en particular la evaluación de los gobiernos y las 
actitudes populistas, han afectado a las posiciones ideológicas de 
los partidos. Nuestros resultados indican que hay diferencias apre-
ciables entre las estimaciones derivadas de modelos que usan va-
riables conectadas a la crisis y aquellas basadas en modelos que 
no usan tales variables. Asimismo, este análisis muestra que las 
estimaciones basadas en modelos que utilizan las evaluaciones de 
rendimiento gubernamental y las actitudes populistas están ligera-
mente más cercanas a las posiciones reales de los partidos políti-
cos. Finalmente, nuestro análisis muestra que las diferencias en las 
estimaciones ideales entre los modelos que usan tales variables y 
los que no las usan son mayores en España e Italia, esto es, en los 
dos países que sufrieron más acusadamente la Gran Recesión. 
Palabras Clave
Actitudes populistas; Competición partidista; Europa; 
Gran Recesión; Ideología; Voto espacial.
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Introduction 
European party systems have experienced cru-
cial changes over the last few decades. New politi-
cal forces have arisen in many countries channeling 
political discontent and grievances directed against 
political parties and/or political elites. The emergence 
and success of these new political forces have been 
facilitated by economic performance failures, lack of 
responsiveness, and perceptions of political corrup-
tion (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018; Andreadis 
et al. 2018). New political forces have emphasized 
the mismanagement and unresponsiveness of politi-
cal elites, and on many instances they have also ap-
pealed to voters by using a populist vocabulary that 
emphasizes the contrast between the people and 
self-serving elites. This portrayal has questioned the 
contemporary relevance of the divisions that histori-
cally structured mass politics in Europe, that is, first 
and foremost, of the left-right division. 
Now, to what extent has the Great Recession al-
tered patterns of ideological spatial competition in 
Europe? And more specifically, do political and atti-
tudinal changes connected to the Great Recession 
affect party positions within the left-right ideological 
space? To examine the effects of these socioeco-
nomic and political transformations we analyze spa-
tial party competition in three European countries 
-Spain, France, and Italy - that share intense and 
long-lasting left-right divides and which have expe-
rienced different degrees of economic duress during 
the Great Recession (very high in Spain and Italy and 
comparatively lower in France). In all these countries 
new and important political forces have emerged at 
the national level (Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, En 
Marche! and La France Insoumise in France, and 
Podemos and Ciudadanos in Spain). Some of these 
forces have explicitly articulated a populist message 
emphasizing the opposition between the people and 
a self-serving and corrupt political elite. The fact that 
for these three countries there are surveys available 
that allow us to examine key variables in this explo-
ration (such as ideological self-placements, percep-
tions of ideological party locations, economic evalua-
tions, and populist attitudes) further justifies the inter-
est of our focus in these three cases. 
Our article focuses on the analysis of the ideologi-
cal positions of parties in Italy, Spain, and France. It 
compares actual ideological positions (as perceived 
by all voters) to the ideal or optimal ideological party 
positions predicted by spatial competition models 
based on proximity and directional voting, always on 
the assumption that parties will choose those posi-
tions that allow them to maximize their vote shares. 
We are interested first in identifying the attitudinal 
factors that condition vote choices and that thus af-
fect party optimal ideological positions in these three 
countries. In the second place, we are interested in 
examining party deviations from the optimal ideologi-
cal locations estimated on the basis of spatial mod-
els. In this analysis, we pay special attention to the ef-
fects of attitudinal variables directly connected to the 
Great Recession. There are some previous works on 
spatial competition and ideological positions in these 
countries. Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005) and 
Curini (2015) have conducted studies on optimal ide-
ological positions in France and Italy. Queralt (2012) 
has contributed a spatial analysis of voting in Spain 
that includes both proximity and directional models, 
but his work does not identify ideal ideological po-
sitions. None of these works address the effects of 
government evaluations and political attitudes on 
ideal ideological positions. 
Different analyses have shown that both populist 
attitudes and economic evaluations have affected 
vote choices in West European countries (Fraile 
and Lewis-Beck 2014; Hernández and Kriesi 2016; 
van Hauwert and van Kessel 2017; Lavezzolo and 
Ramiro 2018; Andreadis et al. 2018). We lack infor-
mation, however, about the degree to which such atti-
tudes have exerted any influence on party ideological 
positions. Does the inclusion of such variables in our 
models affect estimates of ideal positions? Are there 
cross-national differences in the effects of such vari-
ables on ideal ideological positions? And are these 
differences connected to the duress of the economic 
crisis, as in the case of the effects of economic evalu-
ations (Hernández and Kriesi 2016)? Do estimates 
become more or less realistic after the inclusion of 
such variables? And finally, can we identify some 
partisan similarities (ideological, attitudinal, or organi-
zational) among the parties displaying higher differ-
ences between ideal and real positions? 
In order to conduct the analysis we followed the 
unified model of party competition developed by 
Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005, 19-23), which 
predicts ideal party positions according to Nash (that 
is, the set of positions from which no vote-maximizing 
party has incentives to deviate unilaterally (Adams, 
Merrill and Grofman 2005, 40)). In that situation, no 
party would improve its electoral share by unilaterally 
modifying its position. Our models take into consid-
eration both policy (ideological) preferences and non-
policy characteristics and attitudes (including here 
party identification). We first estimate conditional logit 
models explaining vote choices (using both quadratic 
proximity and direction as ideological predictors) and 
then, following Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005), 
we estimate the Nash equilibria for party positions 
using the parameters provided by our analysis. We 
derive Nash equilibria by using the iterative algorithm 
developed by Merrill and Adams (2001), as imple-
mented in the nopp R package (Nash Optimal Party 
Positions) developed by Curini and Iacus (2017). 
The original package only deals with the proximity 
model, therefore we have developed a new R-project 
to implement the directional model. For this analysis 
we have used, for the Italian data, the 2013 ITANES 
post-electoral survey with 1208 respondents.1 The 
French and Spanish data were collected online in 
December 2015 (Spain) and April 2017 (France) by 
the company Netquest. Respondents were selected 
using a quota sampling in order to avoid biases in the 
distribution of gender, age, and territorial location.2 
The final sample was 1208 respondents in Spain and 
803 respondents in France.
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In the next section of this article we present the 
theoretical foundations of our analysis of ideal posi-
tions and our main empirical expectations regard-
ing these cases. We present then our proximity and 
directional vote-choice analyses for these countries 
and the Nash equilibria that we infer from them. Our 
analysis pays special attention to the differences be-
tween ideal and real positions and to the effects that 
crisis-related attitudes have on the estimation of ideal 
positions in these three countries. We conclude with 
a summary of our main empirical findings. 
Theory, Models and Expectations: 
The Analysis of Party 
Ideological Positions 
Our analysis of ideological party positions follows 
the path opened by Downs spatial model of party 
competition, which asserted that political parties 
will adopt ideological platforms in order to maximize 
their vote shares (Downs 1957, 96 and the follow-
ing). Downs (1957, 115) also assumed that voters 
would choose parties based on ideological proxim-
ity. By contrast, the directional model developed by 
Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989 hypothesized that 
individuals would choose parties on the basis of the 
intensity with which they advocate a particular policy 
direction. Spatial analyses of voting and party com-
petition have continued to use both proximity and di-
rectional models of voting (Blais et al. 2001; Maddens 
and Hajnal 2001; Cho and Endersby 2003; Lacy and 
Paolino 2010; Meyer and Müller 2014; Henning, 
Hinich, and Shikano 2015; Kropko and Banda 2018) 
without reaching conclusive evidence favoring one of 
these models over the other (Lewis and King 1999). 
In fact, some analyses have shifted their focus to 
the study of the characteristics (individual, partisan 
and systemic) that favor the prevalence of either of 
these two models of voting (Maddens and Hajnal 
2001; Kropko and Banda 2018). Given the continu-
ing presence of these two models in spatial analyses, 
our work uses both of them in order to estimate ideal 
party positions in these three countries: Spain, Italy 
and France.
Different studies have shown the two-dimension-
al character of European public opinions. Kitschelt 
(1994, 20-33) and Kitschelt with McGann (1995, 
4-19) revealed the presence of an economic (social-
ism versus capitalism) and political-cultural (libertari-
anism versus authoritarianism) dimension structuring 
public opinions in Western Europe. Hooghe, Marks 
and Wilson 2002 also showed that, in addition to the 
classical, economic left-right dimension, a new poli-
tics GAL/TAN dimension (green, alternative, libertar-
ian versus traditional, authoritarian, nationalist) was 
crucial to account for party positions regarding the 
European Union. More recently, but also before the 
Great Recession, Kriesi et al. (2008, 4-20) showed 
that globalization processes led to the formation 
of a two-dimensional policy space in six European 
countries (France, the UK, Switzerland, Austria, the 
Netherlands, and Germany) pitting demarcation and 
integration in two domains, the economic and the 
cultural. Finally, Beramendi et al. (2015, 14-23) have 
hypothesized the existence of a two-dimensional 
public opinion space pitting statism versus promarket 
orientations and universalist versus particularist pref-
erences. In turn, these public preferences would cor-
respond to the main public policy alternatives citizens 
face (state versus market, and consumption versus 
investment policies). The first dimension stressed 
by Beramendi et al. (2015) equals classical left-right 
economic divides, whereas the second one shares 
important features with the political-cultural dimen-
sions identified by previous comparative analyses.
In spite of the conceptual disputes over the char-
acter of these two dimensions (in particular, the po-
litical-cultural one), these different contributions have 
revealed the presence of two critical dimensions of 
conflict in European countries. If this is the case, 
what are the grounds for maintaining an analysis 
focused on a single, classical dimension (left-right) 
of party competition? One crucial reason for continu-
ing with such an analysis is that even if the space of 
public preferences is clearly two-dimensional, “par-
ty systems tend to organize along a single dimen-
sion whose ends correspond to the left-libertarian 
and right-authoritarian poles”, as the Kurella and 
Rosset (2017, 16) study of party systems in England, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
has shown. Shikano 2008 has already revealed 
some of the possible factors (differences in issue sa-
lience and/or non-separability of dimensions) leading 
to this single-dimensional party competition struc-
ture. Whatever the reasons, the fact is that this single 
left-libertarian/right-authoritarian super-dimension ar-
ticulates and reflects economic and political-cultural 
divisions, as in Kitschelt’s 1994 and 1995 classical 
analyses on European social democracy and radical 
right, respectively. It is also for this reason that left-
right positions continue to be used as indicators of 
party positions in substantive dimensions by authors 
that have shown the emergence of new substantive 
policy issues in European politics (Kitschelt and Rehm 
2015: 189). Furthermore, as Vries, Hakhverdian, and 
Lancee’s 2013 study on the evolution of left-right 
self-placements in the Netherlands has shown, the 
increasing importance of cultural divides has not led 
to the demise of the left-right dimension, but to the 
change of its substantive content, which has become 
more tied now to attitudes towards immigration than 
to redistributive preferences. Of course, this single-
dimensionality of political competition may lead to 
significant mismatches and representation gaps be-
tween the preferences of voters and the positions 
of parties, particularly for groups of cross-pressured 
voters, such as left-authoritarian and right-libertarian 
citizens (Kurella and Rosset 2017). The presence of 
congruence inconsistencies in party systems was al-
ready emphasized by Kriesi et al. (2008, 326-27). 
In the case of these three countries, the empirical 
analysis of party positions in the GAL/TAN, economic 
left-right, and general left-right dimensions confirms 
the single dimensionality of party competition at the 
supply-side level. The Pearson correlation between 
general left-right and GAL/TAN party positions is 0.89 
in Spain (14 parties), 0.94 in France (13 parties), and 
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0.90 in Italy (13 parties) (Polk et al. 2017). The Pearson 
correlations between the general left-right and the 
economic left-right are 0.99 for Spain, 0.91 for France, 
and 0.88 for Italy. That is, at the supply-side level, 
and judging from the evaluations of experts, there is 
a very strong connection between the positions par-
ties adopt in the left-right dimension and the positions 
they take in the general cultural GAL/TAN and eco-
nomic left-right dimensions. Therefore, also in these 
three countries the position of parties in the left-right 
dimension allows voters to identify the party program-
matic offers in the two main substantive public policy 
dimensions, that is, the economic state versus market, 
and economic libertarian versus authoritarian (or GAL/
TAN) divisions. Consequently, both the findings of pre-
vious comparative works on European party systems 
and the empirical characteristics of these three party 
systems justify the adherence to an analysis of spatial 
competition that uses left-right positions as the best 
indicator of substantive party policy proposals.3
Historically, the party systems of these three coun-
tries were characterized by the importance of left-right 
divides. We can assume that the substantive content 
of the left-right dimension will have experienced more 
important changes in those countries in which GAL/
TAN divides have become more prominent in the po-
litical arena (particularly in France, in connection to the 
issue of immigration, to a lesser degree in Italy, at least 
until 2013, and to an even lesser extent in Spain). Still, 
as previously indicated, the associations between left-
right party positions and GAL/TAN party positions re-
main extremely high in these three countries. 
Although these countries were characterized by 
diverse political regime trajectories in the past, they 
also share some important historical traits (such as 
the key role of left-right divides, the importance of the 
disputes around the position of the Catholic Church, 
and the impact of Communist parties in the 20th cen-
tury). In addition, these three cases have recently 
witnessed the emergence of new parties that have 
become key political players. These countries, how-
ever, differ substantially in the extent to which they 
have been affected by the Great Recession, Spain 
and Italy having suffered to a greater extent than 
France during this period. If we compare the pre-
crisis peaks and the Great Recession troughs from 
2007 to 2014 (Bozio et al. 2015, 409), we observe 
that per capita GDP dropped by 15.6% in Italy, 9% 
in Spain, and 4.2% in France. As for the unemploy-
ment rate, it rose by 13.7 percent points in Spain, 
3.4 points in Italy and 1.6 points in France. That is, 
in both respects France was the least severely hit 
country during the Great Recession, whereas Spain 
suffered the most in terms of unemployment and Italy 
in terms of per capita wealth (Bozio et al. 2015, 409).
We know that the Great Recession led to the se-
vere punishment of governments in Europe in general 
and in Western Europe in particular (Hernández and 
Kriesi 2016, 221). The punishment of governments 
has extended over time in Western Europe, and it 
has led to the success of new parties in general and 
populist parties in particular (Hernández and Kriesi 
2016, 221). In fact, many recent empirical contribu-
tions have underlined the associations between eco-
nomic evaluations and conditions, populist attitudes 
(Spruyt, Keppens, and van Droogenbroeck 2016; 
Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza 2017), and the vote for 
challenger parties (Bosch and Durán 2017; Lavezollo 
and Ramiro 2018; Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Andreadis 
et al. 2018).We do not know however whether the 
Great Recession has had any substantial effects 
on spatial ideological competition in Europe. On the 
one hand, given the complexity of partisan ideologi-
cal alignments and governmental responsibilities 
during the crisis we cannot assume that the Great 
Recession will have led parties to move in similar 
ideological directions across nations and parties (to 
the left, to the right, to the extremes, etc.). We know 
however that economic evaluations and populist at-
titudes, two variables directly connected to the eco-
nomic crisis, affect the vote-choices of citizens. And 
we can assume that vote maximizing parties will take 
such attitudes into consideration when adopting ideo-
logical positions. For instance, according to Schofield 
(2007), parties with low valence, due in some cases 
to their governmental responsibilities during the cri-
sis, might choose to adopt extreme ideological posi-
tions in order to keep the support of core groups of 
supporters. By contrast, parties that are popular due 
to their lack of responsibilities during the crisis, and 
parties that are in tune with the extension of public 
populist and anti-elite attitudes might increase their 
vote shares by moving to centrist positions. It is im-
possible to summarize the different effects that atti-
tudes related to the crisis may have in different party 
systems. However, we can assume that, at least in 
cases such as these, where left-right divisions have 
played a crucial role in the structuring of party sys-
tems, the more intense the economic crisis, the more 
affected party ideological positions will be by public 
attitudes directly connected to the crisis. More spe-
cifically, we can hypothesize that the inclusion of 
economic judgments and populist attitudes directed 
against the political class will make a greater impact 
on the estimation of ideal party positions in those 
countries that have been more severely hit by the 
crisis (Spain and Italy, in this analysis). Furthermore, 
we can assume that the ideal positions estimated 
on the basis of models using economic evaluations 
and populist attitudes as predictors will be closer to 
real party positions in those countries that have been 
more severely hit by the crisis, again, in Spain and 
Italy. That is, we hypothesize that models including 
economic evaluations and populist attitudes will have 
stronger implications for left-right positions in coun-
tries that have been more severely hit by the reces-
sion, and that the inclusion of these variables in our 
models will make ideal party positions more realistic. 
Analysis and Results
Following Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005), the 
first step in our analysis consists in the prediction of 
vote-choices through a conditional logit model. We 
have restricted our analysis to the parties for which 
a sufficient number of respondents was present in 
our survey - five parties in Spain and France and six 
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in Italy. Specifically, our analysis restricts the sam-
ple to the respondents who voted for the selected 
parties and with data available for all the variables 
we have considered (631 individuals in Italy, 523 
in Spain, and 482 in France). These parties are: 
Sinistra, Ecologia, Libertà (SEL), Partito Democratico 
(PD), Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), Scelta Civica (SC), 
Lega Nord (LN) and Il Popollo delle Libertà (PDL) in 
Italy; Unidad Popular-Izquierda Unida (IU), Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), Podemos (Ps), 
Ciudadanos (Cs) and Partido Popular (PP) in Spain; 
and La France Insoumise (FI), Parti Socialiste (PS), 
En Marche! (EM), Les Républicains (LR), and Front 
National (FN) in France. In the case of Podemos we 
have considered as voters for this party all respond-
ents who voted for the alliances in which Podemos 
participated in Catalonia, Galicia, and Valencia. 
We have conducted our conditional logit models 
using Adams, Merrill and Grofman’s 2005 unified 
proximity model of voting. We implement the proxim-
ity model where the utility is given by the negative 
of the squared distance between the voter’s and the 
party’s location in the left-right dimension - scales 0 
to 10 in Spain and France and 1 to 10 in Italy, and the 
directional model of party competition (Rabinowitz 
and MacDonald 1989), where the utility is given by 
the product of the difference between the respond-
ent’s position and the status quo (neutral point) and 
the difference between the mean party position and 
the status quo, taking in this case the center of the 
scale as the neutral point. 
But we also wanted to control for the effects of 
other policy and non-policy factors to voter utility. In 
this respect, a typical voter utility function with both 
policy and non-policy factors can be expressed as 
follows (Merrill and Adams 2001; Adams, Merrill and 
Grofman 2005; and Calvo and Hellwig 2011):
Ui (j) = αVij + βpij + γjZi + ϵij  (*)
Where Ui (j) represents the utility of voter i for vot-
ing party j and ϵij have standard Type 1 extreme val-
ue distributions. 
The different variables can be grouped into two 
types: 
– Alternative specific variables, which vary with 
the alternatives: Vij and pij.
pij is a vector that describes characteristics of party 
j related to voter i, each coordinate equals to 1 if i 
identifies with party j and 0 elsewhere. As Adams, 
Merrill and Grofman 2005: 37-39 have shown, 
parties have incentives to present policies distant 
from the center in the direction of voters leaning 
towards them for non-policy reasons. Furthermore, 
party identification acts as a stabilizing element 
that limits the ideological flexibility of parties and 
makes the identification of Nash equilibria possi-
ble (Kurella and Pappi 2014). Party identification is 
thus a critical variable for these analyses.4
We have also put to the test the valence model 
developed by Schofield 2006
Ui (j) = λj+ αVij + βpij + γjZi + ϵij
which includes a non-policy related valence term 
λj that captures the perceived competence and 
reputation of party j.5 Ideology and party identifi-
cation coefficients are basically similar to the ones 
reported here. Again, we obtain unique Nash 
equilibria in all the cases. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we do not include full statistical results but they 
are available on demand.6
• Vij has different expressions depending on the 
model we are working with:
Proximity model:  Vij = –(xi – sj)2
Directional model:  Vij = (xi – sq) (sj – sq)
where xi stands for i’s location, sj for j’s location 
(mean of party positions) and sq for the neutral 
point –status quo-. For this analysis we take as 
the objective party location the perceived posi-
tion of the party according to all respondents. We 
are aware that there is a continuous debate on 
the advantages and disadvantages of individu-
ally perceived positions versus average positions. 
We use the average positions perceived by all re-
spondents in order to avoid the risk that citizens 
may project party positions based on their own 
party preferences, and therefore, that party lo-
cations become endogenous to the voters’ pref-
erences (Macdonald, Rabinowitz and Listhaug 
1998), even if this bias has been proved to be 
modest in some analyses (Merrill and Grofman 
1997). In fact, average positions happen to be 
very similar to the evaluations of left-right party 
positions by experts. The Pearson correlation co-
efficients between average perceived positions 
in these surveys and the evaluations of experts 
(Polk et al. 2017) equal 0.93 for Italy, 0.92 for 
France, and 0.99 for Spain. 
– Individual specific variables which do not vary 
with the alternatives, Zi = (Zi1, Zi2, Zi3)T when we do 
not include the evaluation of the government per-
formance and populist public attitude; Zi = (Zi1, Zi2, 
Zi3, Zi4, Zi5)T if we do, and in the mentioned special 
case of Spain in which we consider the regional 
identification, Zi = (Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5, Zi6)T. Table 
1 reports the individual specific variables in our 
analysis. The values of these variables are pre-
sented in the Appendix (Table 10).7
As previously indicated, we use of two indicators 
that we assume to be strongly related to the effects of 
the Great Recession: evaluations of the government 
performance and populist public attitudes. Finally, we 
also use controls for education, gender, age, and in 
the case of Spain, regional identities as measured by 
the Linz-Moreno question.8
The choice model maximizes the utility function in 
(*) and the conditional logit model of vote choice as-
sumes that voter i’s probability of voting for party j is 
given by
Where n stands for the number of political parties.
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values for the estimated parameters in the cases 
of Spain and France, and five in the case of Italy, 
because the program gives the differences with the 
base values, those for PP, PD and LR respective-
ly. The descriptive statistics for these data can be 
found in in Tables 2, 3 and 4 for Italy, Spain and 
France, respectively.
This model cannot determine absolute utility. The 
utility for an individual must be specified with re-
spect to a base value. For these analyses, the PP in 
Spain, the PD in Italy, and LR in France have been 
respectively set as reference levels. The normalized 
utility is given by Ui (j) – Ui (1), where 1 stands for the 
reference level, and j=2,…n. In fact, we obtain four 
Table 1.
Individual specific variables in the model
Table 2.
Descriptive statistics, Italy
Table 3.
Descriptive statistics, Spain
Zi1 sex of voter i sex
Zi2 age of voter i age
Zi3 education of voter i education
Zi4 evaluation of government performance of voter i gov_perf
Zi5 Populism attitude of voter i mean_popul
Zi6 Regional identity of voter i (only in Spain) reg_id
ITALY (584 obs) mean max min sd median IQR Q1 Q3
SEL 2.276 10  0 1.582  2 2 1 3
PD 2.801  10 0 1.462  3 2 2 4
M5S 4.740  10 0 2.158  5 3 3 6
SC 5.455  10 0 1.755  5 1 5 6
LN 8.286  10 0 1.93  9 2 8 10
PDL 8.573  10 0 1.454  9 2 8 10
self 4.678 10 1 2.68 4 4 3 7
sex: Zi1 1.449 2 1 0.498 1 1 1 2
age: Zi2 3.998 6 1 1.655 4 2 3 5
education: Zi3 2.45 4 1 0.904 2 1 2 3
gov_perf: Zi4 4.551 5 2 0.592 5 1 4 5
mean_popul: Zi5 2.656 4 1 0.736 2.5 1 2 3
SPAIN (523 obs) mean max min sd median IQR Q1 Q3
IU 1.189 10 0 1.763 1 2 0 2
Ps 1.459 10 0 2.013 1 2 0 2
PSOE 3.486 10 0 2.365 3 3 2 5
Cs 7.021 10 0 2.355 7 4 5 9
PP 8.642 10 0 1.957 9 2 8 10
self 4.197 10 0 3.086 4 4.5 2 6.5
sex: Zi1 1.417 2 1 0.494 1 1 1 2
age: Zi2 3.966 6 1 1.706 4 3 3 6
education: Zi3 3.367 5 1 1.061 4 1 3 4
gov_perf: Zi4 2.719 5 1 1.082 3 1 2 3
mean_popul: Zi5 3.182 5 1.5 0.761 3.833 1 3.333 4.333
reg_id: Zi6 2.662 5 1 0.907 3 1 2 3
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Table 4.
Descriptive statistics, France
FRANCE (482 obs) mean max min sd median IQR Q1 Q3
FI 2.189 10 0 2.668 1 4 0 4
PS 2.689 10 0 2.348 2 3 1 4
EM 4.849 10 0 2.304 5 2 4 6
LR 7.853 10 0 2.765 8 3 7 10
FN 8.313 10 0 2.013 10 3 7 10
self 5.378 10 0 3.066 5 5 3 8
pID 2.998 5 1 1.4 3 2 2 4
sex: Zi1 1.485 2 1 0.5 1 1 1 2
age: Zi2 3.836 6 1 1.678 4 3 2 5
education: Zi3 3.452 4 1 0.72 4 1 3 4
gov_perf: Zi4 3.228 5 1 1.127 3 2 2 4
mean_popul: Zi5 3.591 5 1 0.736 3.667 0.833 3.167 4
The parameters α and β in equation (*)Ui (j) = αVij 
+ βpij + γjZi + ϵij are respectively the salience of the 
voter’s proximity preference and of the vector pij. γj 
is the vector of estimated parameters for each indi-
vidual specific variable.
We report in Table 5 the coefficients for ideology in 
the proximity and directional models for these three 
cases. Full statistical results are presented in the 
Appendix (Tables 11-13). As we expect, the ideology 
coefficient plays a crucial explanatory role and is al-
ways significant at the 0.001 level. Ideology coeffi-
cients (both proximity and directional) are very similar 
in Spain and Italy, and they are clearly smaller in the 
French case. 
Based on the coefficients estimated by our con-
ditional logit model we have inferred the Nash equi-
libria of party ideological positions. The different par-
ties are the agents that compete for the voters. We 
assume that their only expectation is to maximize 
their utilities, that is, to get as much electoral share 
as possible. Each agent has to select one among 
all the possible alternatives or strategies (a point on 
the left-right dimension) and a Nash equilibrium (NE) 
is the solution that selects the set of positions from 
which no vote-maximizing party has incentives to 
unilaterally deviate. In that situation, no party would 
improve its electoral share by unilaterally modifying 
its position. That means that if x = (x1, …, xn) is a vec-
tor of strategies NE, any deviation of an agent i to x´i 
while all others remain without changes in their ini-
tial positions, (x1,…,xi-1, xi+1,…,xn), would lead this agent 
to lose votes or, at most, to remain equal, but the 
agent would never improve. To compute these NE we 
use the iterative algorithm proposed by Merrill and 
Adams 2001. Assuming that parties maximize vote 
shares, in each step of the algorithm each party’s 
position shifts to its vote-maximizing position hold-
ing the other parties’ positions constant. This leads 
to a new vector of party positions and eventually con-
verges to a NE. In fact, citing Curini and Iacus 2017, 
“there is a unique Nash equilibrium that is independ-
ent of the randomly generated starting points used in 
the algorithm for parties’ initial placements”. Table 6 
reports these results.9
In order to assess the effects on party positions of 
crisis-related perceptions and attitudes, we have also 
estimated the ideal party positions after conducting 
models that do not include government performance 
evaluations or populist attitudes. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we do not report estimates based on models 
with populist attitudes and without government evalu-
ations nor those based on models without populist 
attitudes and with government evaluations. 
Table 5.
Ideological coefficients 
Italy 2013 Spain 2015 France 2017
Ideology Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5, Zi6 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5
Proximity model 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.032***
Directional model 0.101*** 0.107*** 0.063***
*** Significant at the 0.001 level
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Table 6.
Actual (as perceived by all voters) and ideal party positions  
(Nash Equilibria) in proximity and directional models
ITALY
Proximity model Directional model
Actual Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5
SEL 2.276 2.996 3.143 3.009 3.107
PD 2.801 3.863 3.933 3.857 3.911
M5S 4.740 4.503 4.654 4.593 4.732
SC 5.455 5.358 5.430 5.313 5.389
LN 8.286 5.114 5.358 5.406 5.715
PDL 8.573 6.201 6.505 6.613 6.874
SPAIN
Proximity model Directional model
Actual Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5, Zi6 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5, Zi6
IU 1.189 2.141 2.386 2.184 2.467
Ps 1.459 2.667 2.550 2.690 2.566
PSOE 3.486 2.567 2.538 2.901 2.789
Cs 7.021 4.180 3.994 4.212 4.064
PP 8.642 4.520 4.851 5.380 5.603
FRANCE
Proximity model Directional model
Actual Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5
FI 2.189 4.425 4.298 4.371 4.264
PS 2.689 3.076 3.075 3.120 3.125
EM 4.849 4.956 4.815 5.061 4.907
LR 7.859 6.762 6.703 6.806 6.757
FN 8.313 5.681 5.491 5.911 5.701
We then compare those ideal positions to the ac-
tual positions of political parties as perceived by all 
voters in the sample. Figures 1, 2, and 3 report the 
actual party positions and the ideal party positions (in 
Nash equilibria) for these three countries and both 
voting models with and without our two crisis-related 
variables.10
Table 7 reports the maximum ideological spread in 
directional and proximity models for the full models 
(including government performance and populist at-
titudes). The data reported shows that the positions 
estimated by both proximity and directional models 
have a strong centripetal bias.11 The directional mod-
el makes a better job at predicting the spread of ideo-
logical positions in Spain and Italy, but both models 
fail to predict the extreme character of the party posi-
tions of the PP and Cs in Spain, the PDL and the LN 
in Italy, and FI, LR, and the FN in France. To a lesser 
degree, ideal estimates are also more centrist than 
real positions in the cases of SEL and PD in Italy, 
and Podemos and IU in Spain. The PSOE is the only 
party whose ideal position was more extreme than 
its real position. In France there is a clear instance 
of ideological leapfrogging in the ideal positions pre-
dicted for the PS, which is now to the left of FI. In 
general, as Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005, 104-
105) point out, ideological leapfrogging makes more 
sense for small parties.
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Figure 1.
Ideal and actual party positions in Italy (2013)
Figure 2.
Ideal and actual party positions in Spain (2015)
Figure 3.
 Ideal and actual party positions in France (2017)
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The data reported in Table 7 allow us to draw some 
descriptive comparative inferences as well. In the 
first place, real ideological spread is highest in Spain, 
and this despite the fact that this country presents the 
lowest ideological spread in ideal positions in both di-
rectional and proximity models. Average differences 
between ideal and optimal positions are also highest 
in this country, intermediate in France, and lowest in 
Italy. These comparisons suggest that the Spanish 
party system is the one in which centrifugal logics of 
representation are more intense. 
Figure 4 displays the ideological positions of par-
ties according to experts (Polk et al. 2017) and the 
average absolute differences between ideal and 
real positions in proximity and directional models. It 
shows that deviations between ideal and real posi-
tions are higher for radical parties in general and for 
rightist parties in particular. The association between 
ideological extremeness and real-ideal deviations re-
flects the centripetal bias of spatial models. It is more 
difficult to account for the fact that these deviations 
are particularly large for rightist parties, irrespective 
of the party family (Christian-Democracy, Radical 
Right, Liberalism) these parties belong to. If we take 
the seven parties with higher real-ideal deviations 
(PP, Cs, LN, FN, FI, PDL, LR), six of them are located 
on the right of the political spectrum.12
As previously stated, our data do not allow us to 
assess the impact that party valences for party ac-
tivists have on party positions. Our survey data pro-
vides us however with general public evaluations 
of political parties. Analysis of this data allows us to 
establish that some of the rightist parties displaying 
strong real-ideal deviations, such as the PP, LN, PDL 
and LR suffer from poor citizen evaluations (Figure 
5)13 and that the Pearson correlation between pub-
lic evaluations and ideal-real deviations variables is 
negative (-0.37 for un-weighted data and -0.40 for 
weighted data). However, neither Cs, nor FN, nor 
FI, three parties also displaying strong real-ideal de-
viations, suffer from bad public evaluations. Still, if 
anything, our data is inconsistent with the idea that 
parties with high valence enjoy the freedom to move 
to extreme ideological positions. 
Table 7.
Real and ideal ideological spread in France, Italy, and Spain
Ideological spread Italy 2013 Spain 2015 France 2017
Actual 6.30 7.45 6.12
Proximity 3.36 2.47 3.63
Directional 3.77 3.14 3.63
Figure 4.
Real ideological positions (Polk et al 2017) and average absolute differences between real and ideal posi-
tions (in directional and proximity models)
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We lack data on party valence for militants and also 
on the ideological positions of party militants, and there-
fore cannot assess whether parties deviate from opti-
mal positions in order to better channel the preferences 
of their activists. We have however some information 
on the degree to which party activists enjoy power in 
some of these parties. Von dem Berge and Poguntke 
(2017, 147) and Bolin et al. (2017, 177-180) have pro-
vided us with an indicator for Assembly-based Intra-
party Democracy (AIPD) which reports data for just 
seven of the parties included in our analyses (LR and 
PS in France, PDL, LN, and PD in Italy, and PP, PSOE, 
and IU in Spain). Thanks to this information we know 
that it is not the case that parties with strong demo-
cratic participation deviate more from optimal positions: 
in fact, the Pearson correlation between absolute ideal-
real deviations and party democracy is although weak, 
negative (-0.45), parties with more democratic struc-
tures tending to be closer to their optimal ideological 
positions than parties with more hierarchical structures. 
Furthermore, parties with stronger internal democratic 
practices tend to have a higher general public valence 
(Pearson correlation of +0.88). It is possible therefore 
that parties with lower public valence move to the ex-
tremes and deviate thus more from their optimal posi-
tions (Schofield 2007: 136), but in these cases the rea-
son for that does not seem to lie in the internal power 
of party activists. If anything, democratic parties tend to 
be closer to their optimal ideological positions and tend 
to enjoy higher public valence.
We examine finally whether public attitudes strong-
ly connected to the Great Recession (evaluations of 
governmental performance and populist attitudes) 
have some likely effects on the optimal ideological 
positions of parties. Table 8 reports the Pearson cor-
relations between real and ideal positions estimated 
with and without crisis-related variables so that we 
can assess whether the inclusion of these variables 
affect the realism of our predictions. We report the co-
efficients weighted and non-weighted by vote results 
in the general elections that were closer to the survey 
date. The Pearson correlation coefficients reveal that 
estimated positions are slightly more realistic for both 
proximity and directional models when we include 
crisis-related variables, the directional model show-
ing the highest degree of association between ideal 
and real positions. This result holds for analyses with 
weighted and non-weighted data, with results based 
on directional models being more realistic than those 
based on proximity models.
We can also examine the national effects of crisis-
related variables by comparing the differences they 
make to ideal positions in these three cases. Table 
9 reports the average absolute differences between 
ideal and real positions in models estimated with and 
without crisis-related variables. The larger these dif-
ferences, the stronger the difference these variables 
make in the estimation of ideal positions. Table 9 
shows that differences are far larger in Spain and 
Italy than in France, both in proximity and directional 
models. These results are consistent with our expec-
tation that these two crisis-related variables will ex-
ert more influence on ideal party locations in the two 
countries that suffered most in the Great Recession.
Figure 5.
Party valence (averages public evaluations) and average differences between ideal-real positions in proximi-
ty and directional models
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Now, these differences are not uniform across par-
ties, but they are particularly large in some specific 
cases. Figures 2 and 3 show that in Spain and Italy 
these differences are particularly large in the cases 
of PDL, LN, and PP. In all these cases, the inclu-
sion of crisis-related variables pushes these parties 
towards the right and makes their ideal positions 
closer to their real positions, which suggests that the 
inclusion of these variables makes our models more 
realistic. Interestingly, all these parties had govern-
mental responsibilities at some point during the Great 
Recession (from 2008 to 2011 in the case of the LN 
and PDL, and from 2011 to 2015 –the survey date- in 
the case of the PP). In the case of Italy, however, at 
the time the survey was conducted the government 
was presided over by the independent technocrat 
Mario Monti, who enjoyed the support of the PDL 
and the PD, among other parties. These differences 
in the trajectories of governmental responsibility not-
withstanding, our findings suggest that, in all these 
cases, due to the distribution of orientations in the 
electorate, populist attitudes and governmental eval-
uations tended to push rightist parties to the right. 
Concluding reflections
We started this analysis with the goal of assess-
ing the degree to which crisis-related attitudes 
(evaluations of governmental performance and pop-
ulist attitudes directed against the political class) 
affected party ideological positions after the Great 
Recession. With that purpose in mind we followed 
Adams, Merrill and Grofman’s 2005 unified model 
of party competition in order to predict ideal party 
positions with and without crisis-related variables, 
an analysis for which we used both proximity and di-
rectional models. Our goal did not lay in the theoreti-
cal and methodological revision of standard models 
of party competition, but on the use of such models 
to analyze and identify some likely patterns of ideo-
logical change in the face of the Great Recession. 
The ideal party positions obtained were strongly 
correlated with the real positions of political parties. 
However, as it is typically the case in spatial models, 
ideal positions had a strong centripetal bias, even if this 
bias was less pronounced in directional models. More 
interestingly, given the goals of our analysis, we found 
appreciable differences between the ideal positions in-
ferred using crisis-related variables and those derived 
from models that did not include such variables. Ideal 
party positions based on models using governmental 
performance evaluations and populist attitudes were 
slightly closer to the real positions of political parties 
(see Table 8), which means that the inclusion of these 
variables made our results more realistic. And also, 
as hypothesized at the beginning of our analysis, dif-
ferences in ideal party positions were clearly larger in 
the two countries that had suffered the most during 
the Great Recession, that is, in Spain and Italy (Table 
9). In these two respects, our expectations were not 
disconfirmed by our empirical findings. Furthermore, 
such differences affected in particular parties located 
at the right of the political spectrum (Figure 4) and suf-
fering from negative public evaluations (Figure 5). 
More rigorous tests of our expectations regarding 
the effects of the Great Recession on partisan ideo-
logical positions and spatial competition would re-
quire including a greater number of European coun-
tries in the analysis, and also examining variations 
across time in the patterns we previously identified. 
Unfortunately, lack of available data makes it impos-
sible to develop such kind of analysis at this moment. 
As of now, however, our small-N comparative analy-
sis works as a plausibility probe for our hypotheses 
on the effects of the Great Recession on spatial com-
petition and thus paves the way for more systematic 
analyses on these issues.
Table 8.
Pearson correlation between real and ideal party positions with different spatial and specification models 
(16 parties)
Table 9.
Average absolute differences between ideal positions derived from models using populist attitudes and 
government performance evaluations and models not using these two variables
Proximity w/o popu-
lism and performance
Proximity with popu-
lism and performance
Directional w/o popu-
lism and performance
Directional with popu-
lism and performance
Non weighted 0.817** 0.834** 0.878** 0.884**
Weighted by vote 
percentage 0.782** 0.81** 0.873** 0.88**
** Significant at the 0.01 level
Italy Spain France
Proximity 0.165 0.176 0.104
Directional 0.16 0.178 0.106
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Notes
1. Itanes 2013. Inchiesta campionaria sulle ellezione 
politiche del 2013.
2. The Spanish and French online surveys were ISO 
26362 certified panel surveys. 
3. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that 
party systems have dimensions that are orthogonal 
to the left-right dimension. This may be the case of 
the center-periphery dimension that is present in the 
Spanish party system. Our Spanish analysis is restrict-
ed to Spanish-wide political parties, and it does not in-
clude therefore the vote for subnational parties. In spite 
of this, we have opted for controlling for regional identi-
ties in our conditional logit analysis. 
4. Following standard practices (Adams, Merrill and 
Grofman 2005: 160), in the case of Spain, we use re-
called vote as an indicator for party identification, in the 
absence of a direct question on party attachments. 
5. Schofield (2006) has proposed also an internal va-
lence model to predict party positions that takes into 
consideration party valences for party activists. When 
adopting policy positions, parties must balance both 
their direct electoral appeal and how they are viewed 
by party activists, who can commit resources and sup-
port depending on their evaluations of their own par-
ties. We lack data on party valences for party activists 
and therefore cannot test this model.
6. Following Schofield (2006), Kurella and Pappi (2014) ap-
ply the valence model with quadratic utility and three pol-
icy issue dimensions to the analysis of party competition 
in Germany in 2009. For the reasons we stated before, 
and also due to the extreme complexity that a compara-
tive analysis based on a spatial multidimensional model 
would entail, we focus here on the left-right dimension.
7. In the cases of Spain and France, we use as indica-
tor for populism the average value of the six-item bat-
tery of questions developed by Akkerman, Mudde and 
Zaslove 2014.
Agreement with these sentences is ranked from 1 to 5). 
In Spain these six questions read as follows:
- Los políticos en el congreso tienen que seguir la vo-
luntad del pueblo. 
- Las decisiones más importantes deberían ser toma-
das por el pueblo y no por los políticos. 
- Las diferencias políticas entre la elite y el pueblo son 
más grandes que las diferencias que existen dentro 
del pueblo. 
- Preferiría ser representado por un ciudadano común 
y corriente que por un político experimentado 
- Los políticos hablan mucho y hacen muy poco. 
- En política se llama acuerdo a lo que realmente sig-
nifica renunciar a los propios principios. 
In France the six populism questions read as follows: 
- Les politiciens doivent suivre la volonté du peuple 
dans le Congrès.
- C’est le peuple qui devrait prendre les décisions les 
plus importantes au lieu des politiciens.
- Les différences politiques entre l’élite et le peuple 
sont plus grandes que les différences qui existent à 
l’intérieur du peuple. 
- J’aimerais être représenté/e plutôt pas un citoyen 
courant que par un politicien expérimenté.
- Les politiciens parlent beaucoup et agissent très peu.
- En politique, on appelle un accord ce qu’en réalité 
signifie renoncer aux propres principes.
In the case of Italy we use the average of the two 
ITANES questions that more closely resemble ques-
tions included in Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove’s 
2014 battery: 
D22_5 (Se gli italiani potessero decidere sulle que-
stioni politiche importanti in prima persona invece di 
affidarsi ai politici, per il paese sarebbe molto meglio), 
D22_1 (Fare compromessi in politica significa in realtà 
svendere i propri principi). 
Agreement with these sentences is ranked from 1 to 4.
8. Based on the Linz-Moreno question, the standard 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) ques-
tion on the balance of Spanish and regional identi-
ties, which asks people if they feel only Spanish; more 
Spanish than from their autonomous community; both 
Spanish and from their autonomous community; more 
from their autonomous community than Spanish; only 
from their autonomous community.
9. We also report in the appendix (Table 14) the vote 
shares that parties would obtain if they adopted their 
ideal positions. 
10. We follow in these figures the most standard graph 
type (Adams, Merrill and Grofman 2005; Meyer and 
Müller 2014). In that type of graph, lines link party posi-
tions in public perceptions or Nash equilibria, and do 
not reveal any kind of trend.
11. This centripetal bias of spatial models has been estab-
lished in similar analyses for other European countries. 
In Meyer and Müller’s 2014 work on the Austrian party 
system, the spread of party positions predicted by the 
proximity model is 1.2, whereas the actual ideological 
spread equals 5.3 points. See also Curini (2015, 90). 
It might be the case that the extreme preferences of 
party activists lead some parties to take extreme ideo-
logical positions (Kurella and Pappi 2014), but we lack 
the data necessary to test this hypothesis. 
12. This contemporary centrifugal bias on the part of con-
servative forces runs against Curini’s (2015, 93-94) 
previous findings on the actual centrifugal trends of 
Communist parties and centripetal trends of Christian-
Democratic, Liberal and even far right parties. By con-
trast, Meyer and Müller 2014: 808 find that in Austria 
differences between actual and ideal positions reach 
their peak for the radical right parties FPÖ and BZÖ.
13. Reported party valences derive from the following 
questions: P36 in Spain (evaluation of candidates), 
P41 in France (evaluation of candidates) and D55 in 
Italy (evaluation of parties).
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Appendix
Table 10.
Values of the individual variables
DIFFERENT VALUES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES  
Zi1
Man 1
Woman 2
Zi2
18-24 1
25-34 2
35-44 3
45-54 4
55-65 5
66+ 6
Zi3
Primary education or less 1
Secondary education 2
Upper secondary education 3
College education or more 4
Zi4
It is much better 1
It is a little better 2
It remains the same 3
It is a little worse 4
It is much worse 5
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DIFFERENT VALUES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES  
Zi5
Entirely disagree 1
Disagree 2
Neither agree nor disagree 3
Agree 4
Entirely agree 5
Zi6
I feel only Spanish 1
I feel more Spanish than from my region 2
I feel as Spanish as from my region 3
I feel more from my region than Spanish 4
I feel only from my region 5
Table 11.
Italy 2013
Proximity model Directional model
Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5
ideology 0.049***(0.013)
0.051***
(0.013)
0.091***
(0.024)
0.101***
(0.026)
party ID 3.740***(0.217)
3.794***
(0.231)
3.754***
(0.217)
3.794***
(0.231)
sex:SEL 0.597(0.508)
0.180
(0.633)
0.547
(0.507)
0.159
(0.633)
sex:M5S 0.418(0.363)
-0.080
(0.475)
0.516
(0.365)
-0.057
(0.475)
sex:SC -0.634(0.543)
-0.557
(0.695)
-0.535
(0.543)
-0.530
(0.694)
sex:LN -1.539.(0.897)
-0.964
(0.984)
-1.528.
(0.891)
-0.966
(0.983
sex:PDL -0.486(0.510)
-0.001
(0.629)
-0.503
(0.507)
-0.010
(0.628)
age:SEL -0.615**(0.213)
-0.688**
(0.225)
-0.621**
(0.213)
-0.690**
(0.225))
age:M5S -0.521**(0.162)
-0.574***
(0.168)
-0.504**
(0.162)
-0.569***
(0.168)
age:SC -0.474*(0.230)
-0.442.
(0.253)
-0.450.
(0.231)
-0.434.
(0.253)
age:LN -0.310(0.273)
-0.178
(0.299)
-0.307
(0.271)
-0.177
(0.299)
age:PDL -0.596**(0.198)
-0.508*
(0.208)
-0.595**
(0.196)
-0.507*
(0.207)
education:SEL 0.173(0.376)
-0.129
(0.479)
0.153
(0.376)
-0.126
(0.478)
education:M5S 0.824**(0.280)
0.542.
(0.319)
0.857**
(0.280)
0.547.
(0.320)
education:SC 0.712.(0.413)
0.775
(0.477)
0.745.
(0.414)
0.775
(0.477)
education:LN 1.079*(0.518)
1.425*
(0.586)
1.060*
(0.513)
1.423*
(0.585))
education:PDL 1.208***(0.356)
1.435***
(0.395)
1.181***
(0.352)
1.432***
(0.394)
gov_perf:SEL 0.221(0.359)
0.198
(0.360)
gov_perf:M5S 0.174(0.272)
0.223
(0.274)
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Table 12.
Spain 2015
Proximity model Directional model
Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5
gov_perf:SC -0.180(0.374)
-0.125
(0.375)
gov_perf:LN -0.375(0.470)
-0.377
(0.470)
gov_perf:PDL -0.369(0.351)
-0.381
(0.351)
mean_popul:SEL 0.233(0.441)
0.226
(0.441)
mean_popul:M5S 0.351(0.343)
0.366
(0.343)
mean_popul:SC 0.158(0.484)
0.174
(0.485)
mean_popul:LN -0.257(0.667)
-0.261
(0.666)
mean_popul:PDL -0.020(0.457)
-0.033
(0.457)
Log-Likelihood: -190.76 Log-Likelihood: -197.02 Log-Likelihood: -190.76 Log-Likelihood: -190.89
Standard errors in brackets
Significance codes: *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
Proximity model Directional model
Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5, Zi6 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5, Zi6
ideology 0.058***(0.008)
0.054***
(0.008)
0.114**
(0.015)
0.107***
(0.015)
partyID 2.073***(0.129)
2.044***
(0.134)
2.072***
(0.129)
2.042***
(0.134)
sex:IU -0.152(0.438)
-0.323
(0.555)
-0.162
(0.436)
-0.331
(0.553)
sex:Ps -0.005(0.353)
-1.045*
(0.463)
0.019
(0.350)
-1.040*
(0.462)
sex:PSOE -0.386(0.348)
-1.044*
(0.458)
-0.223
(0.344)
-0.987*
(0.458)
sex:Cs -0.347(0.304)
-0.942*
(0.400)
-0.221
(0.303)
-0.894*
(0.401)
age:IU -0.296*(0.132)
-0.378*
(0.171)
-0.302*
(0.131
-0.381*
(0.170)
age:Ps -0.286**(0.105)
-0.609***
(0.144)
-0.281**
(0.104)
-0.608***
(0.144)
age:PSOE -0.176.(0.103)
-0.379**
(0.138)
-0.127
(0.102)
-0.360**
(0.138)
age:Cs -0.226*(0.093)
-0.433***
(0.121)
-0.191*
(0.093)
-0.418***
(0.121)
education:IU -0.064(0.213)
-0.110
(0.237)
-0.075
(0.212)
-0.111
(0.237)
education:Ps 0.231(0.161)
-0.078
(0.194)
0.228
(0.160)
-0.073
(0.194)
education:PSOE 0.065(0.161)
-0.099
(0.188)
0.122
(0.161)
-0.067
(0.188)
education:Cs 0.401**(0.141)
0.277.
(0.154)
0.454**
(0.141)
0.308*
(0.155)
gov_perf:IU 0.294(0.309)
0.301
(0.308)
RIS  [online] 2018, 76 (4), e108. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.002
18 . MARÍA DOLORES GARCÍA SANZ, IVÁN LLAMAZARES AND MARÍA AURORA MANRIQUE GARCÍA
Proximity model Directional model
Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5, Zi6 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5, Zi6
gov_perf:Ps 0.478.(0.267)
0.486.
(0.267)
gov_perf:PSOE 0.406(0.261)
0.424
(0.261)
gov_perf:Cs 0.102(0.239)
0.115
(0.239)
mean_popul:IU 0.268(0.352)
0.260
(0.352)
mean_popul:Ps 0.548.(0.295)
0.551.
(0.295)
mean_popul:PSOE 0.301(0.285)
0.359
(0.285)
mean_popul:Cs 0.579*(0.250)
0.627*
(0.252)
reg_id:IU -0.248(0.295)
-0.247
(0.295)
reg_id:Ps 0.232(0.251)
0.233
(0.251)
reg_id:PSOE 0.137(0.248)
0.161
(0.248)
reg_id:Cs -0.031(0.215)
-0.011
(0.216)
Log-Likelihood: -370.92 Log-Likelihood: -357.59 Log-Likelihood: -372.16 Log-Likelihood: -358.09
Standard errors in brackets
Significance codes: *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
Table 13.
France 2017
Proximity model Directional model
Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5
ideology 0.031***(0.007)
0.032***
(0.007)
0.062***
(0.014)
0.063***
(0.015)
party ID 3.043***(0.167)
2.979***
(0.172)
3.038***
(0.167)
2.980***
(0.172)
sex:FI 0.751.(0.448)
0.600
(0.490)
0.751.
(0.448)
0.600
(0.489)
sex:PS 1.085*(0.489)
1.180*
(0.546)
1.099*
(0.489)
1.188*
(0.546)
sex:EM 0.504(0.379)
0.518
(0.416)
0.539
(0.379)
0.539
(0.415)
sex:FN 0.683.(0.413)
0.216
(0.463)
0.671
(0.413)
0.208
(0.463)
age:FI -0.390**(0.135)
-0.348*
(0.158)
-0.390**
(0.135)
-0.347*
(0.157)
age:PS -0.680***(0.153)
-0.603***
(0.170)
-0.676***
(0.153)
-0.601***
(0.170)
age:EM -0.102(0.111)
-0.035
(0.131)
-0.091
(0.111)
-0.029
(0.130)
age:FN -0.168(0.119)
-0.375*
(0.158)
-0.173
(0.119)
-0.379*
(0.158)
education:FI 0.329(0.219)
0.199
(0.272)
0.329
(0.219)
0.198
(0.272)
education:PS -0.020(0.241)
0.045
(0.289)
-0.005
(0.241)
0.053
(0.289)
SPATIAL COMPETITION IN EUROPE AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION . 19
RIS  [online] 2018, 76 (4), e108. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.002
Table 14.
Vote shares in the samples and in Nash equilibria positions
Proximity model Directional model
Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5
education:EM 0.273(0.182)
0.283
(0.227)
0.315.
(0.183)
0.312
(0.228)
education:FN 0.105(0.193)
-0.310
(0.245)
0.090
(0.193)
-0.321
(0.245)
gov_perf:FI -0.705**(0.245)
-0.704**
(0.245)
gov_perf:PS -0.410(0.273)
-0.407
(0.273)
gov_perf:EM -0.375.(0.214)
-0.370.
(0.214)
gov_perf:FN 0.086(0.231)
0.083
(0.230)
mean_popul:FI 0.750*(0.313)
0.752*
(0.313)
mean_popul:PS 0.192(0.332)
0.200
(0.332)
mean_popul:EM 0.249(0.268)
0.271
(0.268)
mean_popul:FN 0.718*(0.285)
0.712*
(0.285)
Log-Likelihood: -298.33 Log-Likelihood: -285.79 Log-Likelihood: -298.25 Log-Likelihood: -285.99
Standard errors in brackets
Significance codes: *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
ITALY
Proximity model Directional model
Sample Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5
SEL 6.8% 6.8% 7.0% 6.8% 6.9%
PD 41.6% 41.2% 41.2% 40.9% 40.9%
M5S 22.3% 21.7% 22.2% 22.6% 23.2%
SC 4.6% 4.6% 4.5% 4.8% 4.8%
LN 2.4% 2.8% 2.6% 2.6% 2.4%
PDL 22.3% 22.9% 22.6% 22.2% 21.9%
SPAIN
Proximity model Directional model
Sample Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5, Zi6 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5, Zi6
PP 31.7% 38.3% 36,4% 32.9% 31.9%
PSOE 16.7% 13.6% 14.0% 18.3% 18.4%
Ps 30.6% 25.7% 27.3% 24.9% 26.2%
Cs 14.9% 17.2% 17.1% 18.9% 18.8%
IU 6.1% 5.3% 5.3% 5.2% 4.7%
FRANCE
Proximity model Directional model
Sample Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3 Zi1, Zi2, Zi3, Zi4, Zi5
FI 18.3% 18.3% 18.2% 17.6% 17.6%
PS 9.5% 9.6% 9.6% 10.0% 9.9%
EM 29.5% 28.8% 28.7% 30.5% 30.3%
LR 20.3% 20.4% 20.4% 20.3% 20.2%
FN 22.4% 22.9% 23.3% 21.5% 22.0%
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